In this study, we employ a diff erence-in-diff erence, gravity-equation approach to quantifying the trade impact of hightechnology export controls that are motivated by national security. We estimate the eff ect of controls on high-tech export performance of the United States, of its traditional rival (peer) exporters, and of emerging exporters. Using an 11-year panel of seven high-tech sectors from 1994 through 2004, we fi nd that the United States under-exports to "high-threat" importers. We fi nd, more surprisingly, that the United States over-exports to "medium-threat" importers and to a large "trusted" group of importers, both relative to a norm (default group) of importers. We fi nd that traditional peer exporters under-export to the trusted group of importers, and along with emerging exporters, under-export to most medium-threat importers. Th ese fi ndings, robust in a comparable dataset ending in 2011, suggest high substitutability between export suppliers and export markets for high-tech products. Th e same peer exporters over-export to high-threat importers, suggesting their less stringent enforcement of multilateral export controls and also undermining to a certain extent, the security objective of the very strictest of these controls. Overall, importers deemed security threats import only half of their high-tech potential from the 10 exporters on which we focus. Our study underlines the importance of current American eff orts to reform the export control regime to make it more target-eff ective. and that were prominent in estimates for the early 1990s.
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
In the early 1990s, as the Cold War ended, US export controls that aimed to keep high-tech goods and technologies out of the hands of enemies deterred between $15 billion and $25 billion of such exports, roughly 5 percent (Richardson 1993) . Recent US export controls, aimed at a diff erent set of enemies, and only modestly changed in administrative structure, have been criticized widely for their unwieldy imprecision and ineff ectiveness, especially as the capability to export high-tech products has spread from traditional western exporters to those in emerging countries.
1 Both Congress and the administration committed in 2010 to a radical restructuring of export controls aimed at improving their threat deterrence and at preserving American technological momentum. 2 Th at restructuring eff ort is still under way.
Below the surface of the important policy discussion and reform eff ort lie several mysteries. Using the same techniques as in Richardson (1993) , aggregate estimated shortfalls from US national security controls seem to have fallen from roughly 5 percent of high-tech exports to roughly 1 percent in the mid-2000s, and even less by 2011. US exports to destinations that still face heavy controls, especially China 3 but also Russia, seem no longer to reveal the uniform shortfalls that one might casually suspect and that were prominent in estimates for the early 1990s.
In this working paper, we aim to unpack these mysteries and use modern statistical techniques to replace the judgmental forensics involved in the 1993 study. Both studies employ the so-called gravityequation approach to trade data to establish normal or expected levels of US exports in various sectors and to various trading partners. 4 Over-and under-exports are then identifi ed with unexplained residuals.
In this paper, we add a formal statistical technique called diff erence-in-diff erence estimation to estimate export shortfalls and unexpected export intensity over sectors, trading partners, and time. Th e 1993 study, by contrast, relied on sensible-yet-subjective judgments about gravity-equation residuals that diff ered between low-tech and high-tech sectors, between "trusted" and "targeted" trading partners, and between US exports and that of a group of peer exporters who did not always observe the same controls (some controls were multilateral, others unilateral). We also expand the peer-exporter group to relevant we are able to compare export behavior of the United States and its traditional peers under the export control regime to that of emerging exporters of high-tech products, including Brazil, China, India, Israel, and Mexico, and thereby explore trends in substitution by importing country markets from traditional exporters to emerging suppliers of high-tech products.
We argue that our diff erence-in-diff erence estimation procedure contributes precision to previous studies that estimate the impact of US export controls (Richardson 1993 ) and more broadly, of economic sanctions on trade (Hufbauer et al. 1997 and Elliot et al. 2007 , for example). In addition,
we are able to measure trade diversion and substitution of markets among rival exporters. Besides, the estimation procedure allows us to control for some of the unobserved shocks in export patterns that may be correlated with changes in importer threat status under the export control regime. It also controls for trends in high-tech export competitiveness that are common across all importing partners, such as intrinsic comparative advantage. Similarly, the diff erence-in-diff erence estimation would control for import demand shocks if they aff ect all exporters similarly (e.g., global business cycles among
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD] countries).
We fi nd, as we did in the 1993 study, that the United States under-exports to high-threat countries.
If an importer were to switch to high-threat status from a default status (defi ned below), US exports would almost vanish-to about 3 percent of the norm for default importers. However, since high-threat countries account for less than 1 percent of US high-tech exports, we argue that any gains resulting from promoting these countries to a better importer status under the regime would be negligible. Results also indicate that the United States over-exports to economically large moderate-threat importers and to trusted industrialized countries relative to its peers.
However, we also fi nd a high degree of substitutability between export destinations and export suppliers. Lost US exports to high-threat importers and over-exports to industrialized and moderatethreat importers are typically compensated by peer and emerging-exporter over-exports and underexports, respectively, to the same destinations. For example, though we fi nd that the United States over-exports to medium-to high-threat importers that include large countries like China, India, and Russia, (except in the key electrical machinery sector), many US rivals under-export to the same group.
We also fi nd that these broad patterns hold when we extend our analysis to look at data from 1994 through 2011, results for which are presented in appendix A.
For a full-fl edged triple-diff erence analysis of US export controls, see Sundaram (2011) . However, our alternate specification, detailed in subsequent paragraphs, controls for such unobserved heterogeneity. In fact, in a sense, it is even more demanding than a triple-diff erence specifi cation since it includes dummies for each exporter-importer pair and not just peer pairs. Th is means that average exports from every exporter to each importer (over time) are diff erenced out, helping us control for unobserved country-pair specifi c factors driving export fl ows.
We conclude that our study undergirds the need for a reevaluation of the US export control regime and the resources dedicated by regulators and fi rms to administer and abide by it. Th e regime targets marginal importers successfully. But because of substitutability between export destinations and suppliers, it does not seem to go a long way towards attaining its objective of keeping harmful technology from potential sources of threat to national security. Our results further suggest signifi cant refi nement of the multilateral export control regime to ensure its objectives are met.
THE US EXPORT CONTROL REGIME AND ITS SECURITY-THREAT TIERS
Export controls in the interests of national security were targeted towards the Soviet Bloc countries during the Cold War. Th e United States negotiated multilateral export controls with its allies, the Western Bloc countries. As the Cold War ended, revisions to the export control regime were undertaken in 1993 and subsequently in 1996 with new targets now focused on countries posing terrorist or proliferation threats and on states that tolerated terrorist activities. Th e Wassenaar Arrangements emerged in 1996 with the United States and other industrialized nations (most members of the OECD) negotiating multilateral export controls to prevent dual-use technologies (those with both civilian and military use) falling into enemy hands. Th ough all signatories agreed to multilateral export controls and on lists of classifi ed products, enforcement of these multilateral controls was largely left to each signatory under the Wassenaar Arrangements. Th e United States was historically seen as being a more stringent enforcer of export controls than its peer exporters (Richardson 1993) . Table 1a provides the complete list of importers and their respective tiers at each point in time.
Documentation on country tiers was obtained primarily from the website of the Bureau of Industry and Security, which also contains foreign policy reports from 1995 through 2005. Importing countries are classifi ed into tiers for export controls on high performance computers. 8 For tier 1 countries, though exporters are required to maintain records of shipments and sometimes forward information to the government as requested, most exports are allowed to proceed without prior government review (license exception). Most OECD importers fall under this category and we refer to tier 1 as trusted importers.
For tier 2 countries, which are countries with a low risk profi le, no prior government review is required for exports of most product categories, though certain sensitive product sub-categories require an export license. Most importers fall under this category and we conceive this as our default tier, as detailed 8. Technically, the tier classifi cation system applies only to categories of high performance computers. Biological and chemical agents and associated equipment and software, missile technology, communication technology, and satellites and encryption are other major categories of high-tech exports where controls apply but are not strictly governed by the tier system. Nevertheless, the importing countries to which export controls apply in these categories conform very closely to countries designated as tier 3 and tier 4 countries in the high performance computers tier classifi cation system. We hence use this classifi cation for all the sector groups we consider.
6 more precisely below. Tier 3 countries are countries that pose proliferation, diversion, or other security risks, and exports to these countries hence require an export license for most product categories. We refer to these as medium-to high-threat importers. In the case of tier 4 countries, exports in most product categories are denied. We hence refer to tier 4 countries as high-threat importers. In table 1b we list the signatories of the Wassenaar Arrangement and its predecessor, the agreement on controls against the Soviet Bloc countries, both multilateral agreements on high-tech export controls.
EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION
We employ two specifi cations.
Diff erence-in-Diff erence Specifi cation
We fi rst estimate the following diff erence-in-diff erence specifi cation of the well-known gravity equation
for exports in each of seven broad high-technology sectors, spanning chemicals, machinery, and equipment, and corresponding to familiar industrial classifi cations:
where X ijt is exports from exporter country i to importer country j; Y ijt are conventional gravity controls (population, GDP per capita for importer and exporter, distance); Tier(s) jt is a dummy variable that equals one if importing country j is a Tier(s) country at time t, where s=1, 3, or 4; it is an exporter-by-year fi xed eff ect;  j is an importer fi xed eff ect; and  ijt is the idiosyncratic error term. Tier 2 is the omitted default tier. In the diff erence-in-diff erence terminology, tier 2 importers are our control group against which we compare our treatment groups, which consist of tier 1, tier 3, and tier 4 importers. Under the premise that export controls have minor impacts on tier 2 trading partners, we can interpret our coeffi cients on tiers 1, 2, and 3 as estimates of the eff ects of controls.
Exporting countries initially include the United States and four traditional peers (United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Japan, i running from 2 to 5). We then extend our analysis to include fi ve emerging exporters (i = 6, …, 10) of high-tech goods. Th ese emerging exporters include Brazil, India, China, Mexico, and Israel: countries listed by the US government as having export capabilities in two or more high-tech sectors. 9 We estimate equation 3.1 for each of seven high-tech sectors separately. Since we include numerous gravity controls in the estimation, we can interpret the coeffi cients on tier eff ects as deviations, or in other words, over-or under-exports from the gravity norm for tier 2 exports.
Here,  1 ,  3 , and  4 provide diff erential tier 1, tier 3, and tier 4 US exports from tier 2 US exports.
Coeffi cients  1i ,  3i , and  4i capture diff erential exports to tiers 1, 3, and 4 over tier 2 exports by each peer exporter i, relative to US exports to the same tier over US tier 2 exports.  1 + 1i ,  3 + 3i , and β 4 + 4i provide diff erential tier 1, tier 3, and tier 4 exports of peer exporter i from its own normal tier 2 exports. If the United States under-exports to tier 3 and 4 importers that are medium-or high-threat importers and over-exports to tier 1 importers relative to tier 2, we would fi nd  1 >0 and  3 and  4 <0. If peers underexport to tier 1 importers and over-export to tier 3 and 4 importers over tier 2 importers relative to the United States, we would fi nd  1i <0,  3i >0, and  4i >0.
Hence,  1 ,  3 , and  4 for the United States and  1i ,  3i , and  4i for each peer i are our diff erencein-diff erence estimators of the impact of high-tech export controls on exports. Th e importer fi xed eff ects control for unobservable importer-specifi c shocks to exports, while the time eff ects (subsumed by the exporter-by-time eff ects) capture unobservable time-specifi c shocks and trends in export patterns. Th e diff erence-in-diff erence estimators for the United States identify the eff ect of export controls on exports by focusing on changes in exports to targeted importers under the export control regime relative to other importers pre-and post-classifi cation into targets at various threat levels. Hence, the identifying assumption is that there are no shocks that aff ect exports to targeted importers relative to other importers at the same time as tier status changes. Additionally, the diff erence-in-diff erence estimators for peers look at these changes relative to the United States (the third diff erence), thus controlling for some of the unobserved importer specifi c shocks that might vary with time if they are common across the peer exporters and the United States. Th e exporter and importer fi xed eff ects also account for time-invariant multilateral resistance 10 terms in the gravity equation.
and biological agents and related technology and software, high performance computers, missile technology, encryption and communications, satellites, and hot-section technology, spanning the seven high-tech sectors we cover in our analysis. Countries like Ukraine, Russia, South Africa, and Th ailand are also reported as having export capabilities in more than two sectors, however, we exclude them due to lack of data availability in the time period we consider.
10. Multilateral resistance describes the way that exports from country i to j cannot be explained completely by bilateral friction or resistance. Such exports also depend on resistance to i exports from all other export destinations and on resistance to j imports from all other suppliers. For instance, this would mean that exports from the United Kingdom to Australia could diff er from exports from the United Kingdom to a third country at a distance equal to that between the United Kingdom and Australia, if Australia was more remote than this third country. Australia's distance from all other exporters would matter in addition to distance between the United Kingdom and Australia. We control for multilateral resistance with importer and exporter fi xed eff ects in equation 3.1 following Redding and Venables (2004) and Rose and van Wincoop (2001) .
8

An Alternative Specifi cation
We also estimate a more demanding specifi cation:
where we include importer-by-time and exporter-by-importer fi xed eff ects along with exporter-by-time fi xed eff ects. However, with importer-by-time eff ects, we are unable to estimate coeffi cients on conventional time-variant gravity-equation determinants such as GDP per capita, nor on tiers 1, 3, and 4 for all exporters (US and peers), since they and our tier 1, 3, and 4 variables vary by importer and time. Hence, we are unable to estimate coeffi cients for tier 1, 3, and 4 for the United States because we naturally treat the United States as our default exporter. Th is is a disadvantage of this more demanding specifi cation.
However, our motivation for estimating this specifi cation is three-fold. First, this approach still identifi es the impact on exports of an importer's designation as a security threat. Second, the importer-by-time and exporter-by-time fi xed eff ects allow multilateral resistance terms to vary over time. Th ird, the exporterimporter fi xed eff ects control for unobserved country-pair specifi c factors associated with export patterns.
Hence, identifi cation is solely and strictly by observing relative changes in export patterns between each country-pair as the importer switches security tiers over time. Since we are unable to estimate the eff ect of export controls on US exports, we retain our diff erence-in-diff erence specifi cation in equation 3.1 as our preferred specifi cation in this working paper. And we ascertain that our results are qualitatively robust to the inclusion of the three sets of fi xed eff ects.
RAW DATA TRENDS
Th e raw data behind our paper reveal patterns on their own. Sometimes these patterns help to interpret subsequent statistical results. At other times, they mislead, and the statistical results correct misimpressions (e.g., so-called smell test). Table 2 gives a sector-wise break down of high-tech exports for the United States, for its traditional peers, and for emerging exporters in the year 2004, the latest in our preferred, industry-oriented data.
11
For each exporter, the fi rst row gives export values, while the second row gives the percentage of its own high-tech exports in that sector. Th e column entries for the second row add up to 100 percent. For the United States and traditional peer exporters, sectors 382 (non-electrical machinery), 383 (electrical machinery), and 384 (transport equipment) account for around 70 percent of high-tech exports.
Among emerging exporters, we see more diversity. Th ough 382 through 384 are still major exporting 11. A parallel trade-oriented data set that extends through 2011 is discussed in notes below. We use it to test the robustness of our industry-oriented results and to update them to 2011. See appendix A. Appendix B documents data sources.
sectors, India, Brazil, and Israel also export proportionally more in sector 351 (industrial chemicals).
China displays disproportionately concentrated exports in sectors 382 (machinery) and 383 (electrical machinery). they over-export to tier 4 countries and under-export to tier 3 countries over tier 2, except for Germany, which over-exports to tier 3 in electrical machinery. Additionally, the United States over-exports to trusted tier 1 countries and the traditional peers under-export to tier 1 countries relatively, indicating that the 2001 consolidation of tiers 1 and 2, thereby promoting tier 2 importers to tier 1, might have been conducive to mitigating overall US high-tech export losses due to export controls. Substitution among destinations for all countries' exports plays an important role in our assessment, much more so than it did in the earlier 1993 study.
RESULTS
We fi rst turn to results for specifi cation 3.1, the main diff erence-in-diff erence specifi cation. We then assess our reliance on tier 2 importers as a suitable default norm (i.e., as a group of importers that are little aff ected by export controls).
We present three sets of results. In the fi rst set of tables (tables 4a, 4b, and 4c), we present results for For example, from 4b, the total eff ect on German exports of an importer switching to tier 3 would be the sum of the coeffi cient on the tier 3 variable (which is the tier 3 eff ect for the United States), plus the coeffi cient on German tier 3 from the "a" tables. Th e interpretations of the coeffi cients in the "a" and "b" tables diff er in the following manner. A positive coeffi cient on tier 3 x exporter for Germany in the "a" Similar to tables 4a and 4b, tables 5a and 5b provide relative and total eff ects for our estimation of equation 3.1 with the United States and traditional peers, but with emerging exporters included. Table   5c looks at estimated US shortfalls or overages to medium-threat and high-threat (tier 3 and 4) export destinations and compensating overages or shortfalls by traditional peer and emerging exporters. It is useful in determining the degree to which US export losses to targeted importers are compensated for by peer exporters, thereby enabling us to get at the overall quantitative eff ect of the export control regime on trade. Table 6a provides relative eff ects for the estimation of equation 3.1 with coeffi cients for each emerging exporter estimated separately, and with India, China, and other tier 3 exporters distinguished. 
Tier 2 Importers, Our Putative Default Norm
We fi rst check if tier 2 makes a useful control group for our purposes. If export controls do not have a signifi cant and systematic eff ect on export patterns of the United States and peer countries, we can interpret diff erential exports to tiers 1, 3, and 4 relative to tier 2 as estimates of the quantitative eff ects of export controls. We do this check by estimating equation 3.1 (and also 3.2, our alternative specification) but with a dummy for tier 2 importers and no dummy for tiers 1, 3, and 4. Th e coeffi cients on tier 2 for the United States and each peer importer reveal if, with all other importers as the control group, the United States and peer countries over-or under-export to tier 2 importers. Results are presented in appendix tables A1 and A2. If tier 2 is an acceptable default norm, then we expect relative diff erences in exports to tier 2 importers over other importers to be minimal. Indeed, coeffi cients show no strong pattern of diff erential over-or under-exports to tier 2 importers by peer exporters. From table A1, only 5 out of 35 coeffi cients are highly precisely estimated, and signifi cant sectoral pairs of coeffi cients have the opposite sign-the US exports more and Germany less of electrical machinery (383) than the norm, and the United States exports less transport equipment (384) and Japan more than the norm. Th e pattern of the relatively rare signifi cant coeffi cients is close to random. We take this to imply reasonable support for treating tier 2 importing countries as our norm. Table 4a presents results for equation 3.1 for each of the seven high-tech sectors. Coeffi cients on tier 1, tier 3, and tier 4 are for the United States, while coeffi cients on tier 1, tier 3, and tier 4 interacted with each peer dummy give coeffi cients for the respective peer exporter relative to the United States. Results none of the US tier 3 coeffi cients can we reject the null hypothesis that there is no systematic diff erence between the two sets of coeffi cients. For peer and emerging exporters, in 30 out of 35 cases we cannot reject the null that there is no systematic diff erence between tier 3 coeffi cients for these two time periods. For tier 4 coeffi cients for traditional peers and emerging exporters, in all cases we cannot reject the null of no systematic diff erence between the two sets of estimates. We also perform a Chow test for equality of coeffi cients estimated on our industry level data for 1994-2004, versus on the trade data for 1994-2011. We fi nd that again, for the United States, we are unable to reject the null hypothesis of no systematic diff erence between coeffi cients for tier 3 and tier 4 importers. Th e same is true for tier 1 coeffi cients for the United States, except in sector 383 (electrical machinery). Th e null hypothesis of no systematic diff erences cannot be rejected for tier 4 coeffi cients for traditional peer and emerging exporters either. In the case of tier 1 and tier 3 importers and traditional peer and emerging exporters, we fi nd systematic diff erences in only a few cases. Th ese cases indicate that the displacement patterns we observe in our results for 1994-2004, namely, that emerging exporters under-export to tier 3 and over-export to tier 1 importers, are exaggerated when we use data for 1994-2011.
Diff erence-in-Diff erence Specifi cation
14. In the alternative specifi cation in appendix table A2, seven out of 28 coeffi cients are highly precisely estimated, and all are positive. Four of these coeffi cients are for Japan alone. Th ese patterns suggest that tier 2 importers are not so normal for traditional peer exporters (especially Japan), however normal they may be for US exports. Since there is no ability in our alternative specifi cation to estimate US over-and under-exports for tier 2, as explained below, we take confi dence in the US-focused robustness provided by appendix table A1.
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from table 4a indicate that the United States over-exports to tier 1 countries relative to tier 2, the default tier, in all sectors, with the eff ect estimated with fair precision for fi ve out of seven sectors. Th e United
States under-exports to tier 4 countries relative to tier 2 in all seven sectors. 15 Th is is in contrast to our four traditional peer countries, who, relative to the United States, under-export slightly to tier 1 countries relative to tier 2 (mildly for Germany and Japan), and over-export to the high-threat tier 4 countries. A natural interpretation of these results casts doubt upon the security effi cacy of multilateral export controls.
Our results seem to suggest that peer exporters do not enforce controls as stringently as the United States.
But the United States seems to be able to make up a portion of its lost tier 4 exports by out-competing traditional peers among trusted tier 1 customers.
For tier 3 countries, the United States results overall seem at fi rst inconclusive. But when we expand peers to include our fi ve emerging exporters in table 5a, the United States appears mildly to over-export relative to tier 2 in fi ve out of the seven sectors, though positive coeffi cients are precisely estimated for only one. In this regression (table 5a) US over-exports to tier 3 look much stronger, and US over-exports to tier 1 much weaker. Th e natural interpretation is still the same-the United States makes up in less-controlled markets what it may lose in tightly controlled markets. But the identity of the over-performing alternative export destinations changes, as we discuss below-US exporters out-perform traditional peers, but not emerging peers, in trusted destinations, but out-perform both in medium-threat destinations.
Among table 4a's traditional peers in tier 3 importers, while no stark patterns emerges overall, the United Kingdom under-exports to tier 3 countries in all sectors with the eff ects being statistically signifi cant in all but one sector, where it is signifi cant at the 10 percent level. A notable exception is the electrical machinery sector (ISIC 383), where the United States signifi cantly under-exports to countries in tier 3, while Germany over-exports to countries in tier 3 relative to the United States. Overall, results suggest losses of US high-tech exports only to tier 4, or high-threat importers.
Exponents of the coeffi cients for tier 4 for the United States in row three of table 4a give the proportional change in US exports when a country switches from tier 2, the default, to tier 4. Th e magnitudes of these eff ects indicate that US exports would virtually vanish-99 to 97 percent losses-to a trading partner demoted from tier 2 to tier 4. 2004 if tier 1 importers were to be promoted from tier 2 (the default) to tier 1. 16 We fi nd that US exports would increase by $58 billion, while German exports would increase slightly less, by $44 billion. French and Japanese exports would actually fall, resulting in a slightly mitigated net gain for these importers from being promoted one tier. Hence, results indicate signifi cant substitution between suppliers by importing countries and across markets (destinations) by exporting countries. We fi nd this echoed in most of our results-results indicate that exporters facing restrictions to certain markets can substitute away to less restricted markets, while exporters with looser controls compensate to a certain extent for export losses in restricted markets. However, as we show in a subsequent discussion, we fi nd that overall, high and medium-threat importers are denied high-tech exports from the 10 exporters included in our analysis.
As the next step, we estimate equation and under-exports in tiers 1 and 3 (Germany again, exceptionally, over-exports electrical machinery to tier 3, relative to the United States). Emerging exporter peers, relative to the United States, signifi cantly over-export to tier 1 countries and tier 4 countries and signifi cantly under-export to tier 3 countries (relative to tier 2 countries). Th is helps explain the interesting eff ects they have on our earlier US estimates. Our previous estimates of US over-exports to the trusted tier 1 countries now essentially disappear. Instead, the United States, relative to both traditional and emerging peers, now appears to over-export to moderate-threat tier 3 importers-signifi cantly in six out of seven sectors. Tier 3 importers now seem to be the compensatory refuge where US exporters make up from losses elsewhere. We attribute these changes in US estimates to the fact that our gravity-norm for exports has now changed.
16. We calculated these changes in billions of dollars as follows: For the United States, the $58 billion fi gure is arrived at as [0.8/(1+0.8)]*$131 billion. In other words, as the tier 1 coeffi cient divided by (1 + tier 1) coeffi cient, multiplied by US exports to tier 1 countries.
17. In order to answer clearly the question of whether foreign availability of high-tech products has grown beyond the traditional western exporters, we constrain the three tier coeffi cients to be the same for each of the fi ve emerging peers. We subsequently loosen this restriction, as we describe below.
Th e peer-exporter bar (norm) has become higher in tier 1 markets (historically more open to emergingcountry exports), and lower in tier 3 markets due to the addition of emerging exporters.
In table 5b we present the marginal eff ects of coeffi cients in table 5a for emerging exporters only.
Marginal eff ects indicate over-or under-exports to tier 1, tier 3, and tier 4 importers by emerging exporters relative to their exports to the default tier 2 importers. Th e table indicates over-exports by emerging exporters to tier 1 countries in all but one industry, scientifi c equipment. Similarly, emerging exporters under-export to tier 3 importers relative to default tier 2 importers in all but one industry:
other chemicals. Emerging exports to high-threat tier 4 importers do not seem to diff er statistically from imports to default tier 2 importers with the exception of transport equipment over-exports. 20 Once again these results suggest a very high degree of substitution between export destinations and export suppliers.
Alternate Specifi cation
We present results for the alternate specifi cation 3.2, which includes importer-by-time, exporter-by-time, and exporter-by-importer fi xed eff ects for the United States, traditional peers, and emerging exporters, in table 7 (most closely related to table 5a in our specifi cation in section 5.2). One advantage of this specifi cation is that these fi xed eff ects control for time-varying multilateral resistance in trade fl ows.
Additionally, the exporter-by-importer fi xed eff ects control for unobserved heterogeneity in countrypair trade relationships by diff erencing out average (over time) exports between each exporter-tier pair, resulting in a tighter identifi cation of the pure eff ect of export control promotions and demotions across tiers on relative export patterns of peer exporters. Under this specifi cation, for identifi cation, we need only 19. Th ese fi ndings, controlling for other determinants of export penetration, contrast with the trends in fi gure 1b.
20. Th e anomalous net Latvian loss of imports from becoming less of a security threat is more exactly a loss only from our 10 focus exporters (the United States and nine peers); we cannot discern whether high-tech producers like Russia or other European suppliers restored some of these losses.
the following, reasonably natural (and weak) condition to hold: any unobserved shocks in export behavior of peer exporters relative to the United States (all relative to the default tier 2 importers) do not follow the exact same pattern over time as importer tier switches.
However, these advantages come at a cost. 21 Th e inclusion of three sets of fi xed eff ects is demanding on the data (it removes much of its inherent variation) and we see some loss in precision of our estimates.
Also, we are unable to estimate the eff ect of export controls on US exports since the specifi cation allows us to estimate only relative export behavior of peers to the United States. Th us, by including importerexporter fi xed eff ects, we throw away some of the variation that we are interested in for the purposes of our fundamental question. Specifi cally, we are unable to look at enduring-for-the-whole-period relative patterns of US over-and under-exports to, for instance, tier 4 versus tier 2 countries.
We present results for traditional peers and emerging exporters in table 7, implicitly relative to the United States. 22 We still fi nd evidence that traditional peer exporters under-export to tier 1 and tier 3 countries and over-export to tier 4 countries, though these results are not precisely estimated for all sectors. We observe that emerging exporters are estimated still to over-export to tier 4 (in two sectors) and under-export to tier 3, but no longer seem to over-export to tier 1. Overall, we fi nd that our results for tier 4 countries remain qualitatively similar, with some diff erences for tier 1 importers.
Specifi cally, once average exports between exporter-importer pairs over the time period are accounted for, emerging exporters do not seem to over-export to tier 1 countries. Th us, our results still present similar implications-substitutability and compensation between export suppliers and destinations, potential export losses for the United States in marginal tier 4 markets, and a suggestion that peer exporters, both traditional and emerging, do not adhere as rigidly to controls in those markets as the United States.
Since the more demanding alternative specifi cation produces results for rich-and emerging-country export rivals (peers) that have the same fl avor and pattern as our preferred diff erence-in-diff erence specifi cation, we add to our confi dence that the diff erence-in-diff erence results for American exports are reliable.
CONCLUSION
Using a diff erence-in-diff erence estimation technique in the framework of a gravity model of trade, this study shows that American high-tech export controls are indeed associated with expected losses of US exports, but only to targeted high-threat importers. However, since these high-threat importers account 21. See DeRosa and Harrigan (2011) for a discussion of why a specifi cation like our preferred 3.1, which uses the crosssection variation in the data in panel data over a short time period, might be preferable to a specifi cation like 3.2, which only uses time variation. Also, see Bergstrand and Egger (2010) for an excellent survey on the estimation of gravity models.
22. We also estimate this specifi cation for traditional peer exporters alone. We fi nd that the coeffi cients are very similar to the ones we observe in table 7 and we do not present them in the paper.
for a negligible proportion of US high-tech exports, loosening controls on these importers would result in modest export gains at best, according to our results. Th ose results indicate that traditional peer exporters like Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and Japan, and indeed, emerging exporters with high-tech capabilities, compensate for some of these US export losses to high-threat importers. Th is suggests that the Wassenaar and similar anti-proliferation arrangements, underpinning multilateral export controls, have not been completely eff ective-to a certain extent, peer countries make up for US shortfalls to highthreat countries. Calls for reengineering and streamlining the multilateral export control regime to ensure its success in meeting its security objective may indeed be well taken. Ultimately, however, our evidence suggests that export controls do deprive high-threat and, in fact, even medium-threat importers of considerable amounts of high-tech exports.
Our fi ndings also reveal that relative to traditional peer exporters, the US over-exports to trusted industrialized countries relative to default importers, though not as much as emerging exporters do.
Traditional peer exporters under-export to these industrialized importers, underscoring our fi nding of a high degree of substitutability between export markets and export suppliers. Th ough emerging peers seem to undercut exceptional US export performance in tier 1 markets, they do not do so in medium-threat tier 3. Tier 3 estimates, in fact, provide some of the most surprising estimates. Th ey would seem to suggest that US fi rms and/or regulators discover ways to ease, perhaps even to bypass, export controls in the case of these specifi c medium-threat importing partners, 23 avoiding US export losses overall.
To sum up in a sentence the policy implications of our estimates, we seem to fi nd that high-tech export controls, like money, are fungible. Th ey can deny a given source country's exports to particular target countries, but those same target countries can reclaim some of their desired import demand by arbitraging across alternative suppliers with diff ering control intensity. Th ey can seem to impose export sacrifi ces on countries with strict controls, but those foregone exports can be diverted toward less dangerous and uncontrolled markets and enhance the hyper-strict country's export competitiveness there.
Export-control fungibility is thus code for two important kinds of eviscerating substitution. First, substitution among exporters with diff ering intensities of controls seems to undermine some of the intended denial of high-tech exports to threatening importers-the importers manage to source some denied imports from alternate suppliers. Second, substitution among destination markets for American and peer exporters seems to off set much of the alleged export shortfall from national-security controlsexporters seem to be able to out-compete their rivals in less-controlled destinations when they have been held back by their own controls in threatening destinations.
Th e former kind of substitution, among exporters, means that there is scope for better coordination among exporters in implementing multilateral controls in the interest of security, though we fi nd 23. Richardson and Sundaram (2013) provide detailed illustrations.
that high-and medium-threat destinations are denied high-tech exports overall. Th e latter kind of substitution, among export destination markets, is good news for those who worry about losses of high-tech export-market share and associated losses of national competitiveness. Wherever there are uncontrolled markets, there's the chance for compensatory export recovery-where there's a will to export, there's a way. Th is good-news kind of substitution also helps explain why this study estimates much smaller American export losses from controls than the Richardson (1993) study did for an earlier generation of export controls.
In conclusion, it appears that modern high-tech export controls do have their intended benefi tthat of keeping potentially dangerous technology from countries perceived as threats, though substitution means that this is somewhat compromised by the ability of these importers to source from US rivals, both traditional and emerging. In markets perceived as moderate threats, export losses are borne by traditional and emerging exporters, not their American counterparts. Th ese fi ndings strongly support the current momentum to refocus and streamline American export controls and push for better implementation of the multilateral regime. 
Missing values:
We fi rst calculate the share of each importer in total exports of each exporter for a given year. We then linearly interpolate the shares over time and calculate exports for missing years for each exporter x importer pair by multiplying the share by total exports. For missing values that remain after this replacement, we set exports to equal zero.
Zero exports are then set to a small value (equal to one), as often done in estimating gravity equations. For a discussion of the risks of this treatment of zero trade fl ows, see DeRosa and Harrigan (2011) .
Distance data (geodesic distance between capitals):
Trade, Production, and Protection Database, see above.
